The collection offers a wealth of information from Roth's early career at the University of Pittsburgh, including his research and correspondence from that period, as well as drafts of some of his well-cited articles and writings. Approximately one-half of the material lies in the Correspondence and Working Papers series. This portion of the collection, arranged alphabetically by correspondent, includes professional correspondence as well as many drafts of scholarly articles. This arrangement replicates Roth's original filing system, which offers insight into his correspondence style and methodology for economics collaboration. Notable correspondents include Roy Weintraub, Robert Aumann, Ido Erev, Uriel Rothblum, and many more. Also included are various subject files, including Winner's Curse, Matching, and Learning.
Another notable component of the collection is Roth's Writings and Research, which includes both working drafts of Roth's own as well as data printouts and other components of his work in game theory and its real-world applications. These files have been grouped by article and are loosely arranged by date. Each article's co-writers or collaborators are noted if known.
The Writings by Others series has some overlap with the Correspondence and Working Drafts series, but for the most part the former includes only the article from Roth's fellow economists, without the collaborative or feedback aspect present in the latter series.
Roth's Teaching and Coursework series includes lecture notes as well as tools such as transparencies used during his economics lectures. Roth's own coursework at Stanford is also present, including notes, exams, syllabi, and lectures on topics such as microeconomics, competitive strategies, game theory, and choice theory.
Finally, the Grant Materials series is arranged by grant application, with each file including application materials, correspondence, reports, and finances relating to the grant.
The Raymond C. Battalio and John B. Van Huyck Papers document their careers as economists at Texas A & M University. The collection provides an overview of their professional activities, particularly their work as experimental economists and influential figures in developing the field of experimental economics during the 1990s. The papers of Battalio and Van Huyck are combined as one collection given their close working relationship. Their joint work focused on a series of experiments showing the likeliness of coordination failures even when incentives guide participants to attempt to coordinate, the aim being to highlight the difficulty of economic coordination. Experiments by Battalio and Van Huyck include studies of the emergence of conventions, numerous coordination games, and peasant-dictator games, among others.
The collection also includes Battlaio and Van Huyck's communications with other prominent contributors to experimental economics such as Colin Camerer, Charles Holt, John Kagel, Thomas Palfrey, Ariel Rubinstein, Alvin Roth, Larry Samuelson, and Vernon Smith, among others.
Along with their own scholarship and writings, the collection documents Battalio and Van Huyck's roles in the Economic Science Association and Van Huyck's as an editor of Experimental Economics; and Battalio and Van Huyck's department roles, committee work, and teaching contributions in economics at Texas A & M.
Extensive digital materials from Battalio and Van Huyck's experiments are also included in the collection. Original naming conventions and file structures in the digital materials are preserved where possible.